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Some Beliefs About Justice 
William K. Frankena 
"Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal." 
St. Pau l, Colossians, 4:1. 
The topic of this lecture is social justice, more specifically, 
distributive justice. One of the good things about this topic is 
that one does not have to be kind to it; one has only to be just. 
Having twice in the past sought to do it justice without success,' 
I now propose to try once more. If I fail to do it justice this 
time-and I am sure I shall-at least it will not be for lack of 
trying. 
Now, as Aristotle points out, one can conceive of justice as 
covering the whole area of morality, of moral virtue, or at le~st 
of moral rightness; Plato, Kant, and, more recently, C. I. Lewis 
come close to conceiving it thus. But this seems to be d istribu-
ting justice a little thin. As]. S. Mill says, we must distinguish 
between justice and "other obligations of morality" like "chari· 
ty or beneficence."2 Even if, like Lewis, we refuse to regard 
charity or beneficence as obligations of morality, we still can-
not identify distributive justice with the whole requirement of 
the moral. For, as Aristotle also says, the justice we are investi-
gating is only a part of virtue, as is shown by the fact that, if a 
man throws down his sh ield in battle, uses abusive language, 
refuses to assist a friend with money, or commits adultery, we 
accuse him, not of injustice (certa inly not of distributive injus-
tice), but of cowardice, bad temper, meanness, or profligacy. 
"Well," it may be said at this point, "this is true of justice 
as ascribed to individuals; there are other things that morality 
requires of individuals besides justice. However, all that can be 
required of a society or stale is that it be just-that it distribute 
justly what it is within its power to distribute. That is, in the 
case of society or the state virtue equals justice, distributive jus-
1 Sec W. K. Frankena, "The Concept of Social Just ice," in R. B. Brandt (cd.), 
Social justice (Englewood Clif£s, N.J., 1962); W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J ., 1963), ch. 3. 
• Cf. J. S. Mill, Uti/itm·ianism, Ch. V. 
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tice." This view has a good deal of plausibility, but it raises the 
problems of the relation of justice to welfare and of welfare to 
the state, and we cannot discuss these here. Our concern now is 
with the question when a society or state is distributively just, 
not with the question whether this is all it should be. 
I. 
There is one principle of distributive justice on which there 
seems to be general agreement, namely, that like cases or in-
dividuals are to be dealt with in the same way or treated alike, 
or that similar cases are to be treated similarly. Chaim Perelman 
calls this the formal principle of justice.8 Now, it does seem 
clear that an act of distributing is at least prima facie unjust if 
it involves treating differently, or discriminating between, in-
dividuals whose cases are similar in all important respects. If 
my case is substantially like yours but it is treated differently, 
one of us has grounds for crying that injustice has been done, 
as any child seems to see instinctively. In this sense, the formal 
principle of justice does formulate a necessary condition of the 
existence of distributive justice. For justice to exist there must 
be regularities or rules that are followed in the distribution of 
what is distributed. Yet a land may be without justice even if 
similar cases are always treated similarly, even if it always dis-
tributes according to rules which are known. A society may 
have and act without fail on rules, laws, and conventions, and 
yet be an epitome of injustice. It depends on what the rules 
and conventions are. In other words, rules, laws, and conven-
tions may themselves be unjust or incorporate injustice. They 
all take the form, "Treat every case of kind X in manner Y," as 
is required by the formal principle, but the manner specified 
may in fact be an unjust way of treating things of the kind in 
question. 
Any set of rules that may prevail in a given society is a se· 
lection from among all possible rules. They classify people in 
terms of certain similarities and neglect others; they also neglect 
certain dissimilarities. They likewise select, from among the 
possible ways of treating people, certain ones, and they assign 
these ways of treatment to the different classes they define. But 
human beings are alike and unlike in all sorts of respects. Not 
• The Idea of ]wtice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1968), pp. 15·16. 
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all of their similarities and differences are important or even 
relevant to the question how they are to be treated, and not 
just any manner of treatment may be assigned to just any class 
of cases. Consistency is a requirement of justice, not merely "a 
hobgoblin of little minds"; but it is not enough, it is not the 
whole of justice. 
In other words, the formal principle of justice does not give 
us a sufficient condition for the existence of justice. As Perel-
man insists,• we must also have some material principles of dis-
tribution, principles that tell us something more about the con-
tent of our rules, more about the similarities and differences 
that are to be regarded as relevant, more about what Jesus 
called the measures with which we are to mete and be measured 
to. This is what we must look for. I shall, however, not seek to 
give a complete and systematic account of the material prin-
ciples of justice. I shall limit my discussion almost entirely to 
a review of some views about the nature of the most basic ma-
terial principle of justice, and to a defense of one of them. 
It is sometimes said that, while the formal principle of jus-
tice is certain but empty, any material principle must be arbi-
trary and uncertain. We must choose one, if we are to have any 
system of justice at all, but our choice cannot have any rational 
basis, since equally valid reasons can be given for choosing 
another.11 I shall not try to take this metaethical position by 
frontal attack, but, instead, will seek to bypass it by offering, 
not indeed a "proof" of any material principle of distributive 
justice, but what Mill calls "considerations determining the 
intellect to give its assent" to one view of justice and to with-
hold it from others.6 That is, I shall simply try to give a rational 
case for one principle and against others. After all, as someone 
once said, the best way to answer a man who says there are no 
giraffes is to show him one. The only trouble about that is that 
one may be caught by a skeptical lion while looking for a giraffe, 
like the drunk who saw double and tried to climb the wrong 
tree. 
II. 
Aristotle's discussions of distributive justice in the Ethics 
'Ibid., .P,P· 27-28. 
5 Cf. ib1Cf., p. 11. But see also pp. ix·x. 
• Op. cit., near end of Ch. I. 
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and Politics will serve as a useful basis for our inquiry.7 Follow-
ing his lead we may say that the typical case of distributive jus-
tice involves ( l) at least two persons, A and B, (2) something to 
be distributed, P, (3) some basis of distribution, Q, and (4) a 
geometrical proportion or ratio such that 
A's share of P 
ll's share of P 
A's share of Q 
B's share of Q 
Then a society is distributively just or has distributive justice 
in so far as it distributes P among its members in proportion to 
their shares of Q. Not all theories of distributive justice accept 
this model quite literally, as we shall see, but we can neverthe-
less use it in order to state the problems involved and the main 
ways in which they may be answered. Clearly, there are two 
questions: 
(a) What is P? That is, what is to be distributed? 
(b) What is Q? What is to be taken as the basis of distribu-
tion? 
Different theories about the material principles of distributive 
justice give different answers to these two questions, especially 
to the second. 
Actually, P, or what is to be distributed, may be almost any-
thing, and will vary from context to context; but on all theories 
of social justice it will consist primarily of such things as offices, 
privileges, tasks, tax burdens, powers, goods, educational oppor-
tunities, vocational opportunities, and the conditions of happi-
ness or of th e good life. As for Q, or the basis of distribution, 
one might, of course, have different theories about the nature of 
Q depending on what P is; for example, if it is musical instru-
ments that are to be distributed one might take musical apti-
tude or taste as a basis of distribution, but if it is college credits 
and grades one might, and presumably should, take perform-
ance in college courses as a basis. Even so, we want to know-
and this is our main problem- what the most basic Q is, if there 
is one, on the basis of which such P's as have been mentioned 
are to be distributed. 
In his discussion of this question Aristotle indicates that 
there have been three main theories of social justice: the olig-
archical, the ari~tocratic, and the democratic theories. They 
7 Sec Nicomachenu Ethics, .Bk. V; Politics, Bk. ill, Ch. IX, X II, XIII. 
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agree about what P is: offices, powers, honors, external goods, 
etc.; what they differ about is Q, the basis oE distribution. The 
oligarchical theory says that Q is wealth or property, i.e., that 
P is to be distributed to people in proportion to their wealth; 
the aristocratic theory holds that Q is merit, i.e., that P is to be 
distributed in accordance with merit; and the democratic 
theory, as Aristotle conceives of it, claims that Q is simply the 
fact of free birth, and that P is to be distributed equally among 
those who arc born free, but, oE course, he was making allow-
ance for slavery, and a contemporary democrat would prefer to 
say that Q is simply the fact of being human. 
Revising Aristotle's scheme somewhat, we may classify 
theories of distributive justice as follows: (I) lnequalitarian 
theories hold that P is to be distributed in proportion to some 
Q which people have in different amounts, degrees, or fonns, 
i.e., in proportion to some feature in which people are unequal. 
They are of three sorts: (a) the oligarchical theory, (b) the 
meritarian or aristocratic theory, (c) other inequalitarian 
theories, e.g., those that identify Q with blood, sex, color, height, 
or native intelligence. (2) Equalitarian or democratic theories 
hold that basically P is to be distributed equally. They are of 
two kinds:s (a) Substantive equalitarianism holds that P is to 
be distributed in proportion to Q; and it identifies Q with some 
feature in which all men are alike or equal. l t is hard to give a 
good example of such a theory because it is hard to find any 
feature in which all men are alike and equal. That is one rea-
son why this kind of equalitarianism finds it so difficult to 
answer the argument that men are not equal since there is no 
Q, no property, which they all have in the same amount and 
form. For example, they all have reason, but they have it in 
different degrees. They all have color, presumably in the same 
degree, but they have it in different forms. One might reply 
that all men are alike or equal in being men or in being human, 
but it is very difficult to make out just what property "being 
human" is, or whether it is a property at all, let alone one which 
everyone has in the same degree and form. (b) Procedural 
equalitarianism agrees with inequalitarianism in denying that 
there is any Q which all men have in the same degree and form. 
But it still maintains ·a basically equalitarian view of distribu-
· • See S. I. Berm and R. S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State 
(London, 1959), pp. 108·111: · · · · 
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tive justice. To do this it gives up the Aristotelian model which 
holds that P is to be distributed in accordance with some Q. 
There is, it maintains, no Q of the kind required. It therefore 
regards equalitarianism as a "procedural" principle: Treat 
people equally unless and until there is a justification for treat-
ing them unequally. This is a procedural principle because it 
says, not that men are equal in a certain respect and therefore 
should be treated equally, but only that unequal treatment 
must be justified or defended, whereas equality of treatment 
needs no justification. 
Before going on, I should like to say something here about 
the question, "Are Men Equal?" All equalitarians answer "Yes" 
to this in some sense, and all inequalitarians "No." But we must 
notice that the question has two senses, a factual sense and a 
normative one. In the factual sense it asks, "Is there any re-
spect in which all men are in fact equal, any Q which they all 
have in the same degree and form?" In the normative sense it 
asks something very different, namely, "Ought all men to be 
treated as equals?" Thus there are really two distinct questions, 
though this is not always noticed. The real issue between 
equalitarians and inequalitarians is over the normative ques-
tion whether all men ought to be treated equally; it is to this 
question that the former must say "Yes" and the latter "No." 
But the inequalitarians always say "No" to the factual ques-
tion too, and, in fact, they rest their negative answer to the 
normative question at least in part on a negative answer to the 
factual one; they argue that men should be treated differently 
because they are different. Equalitarians, on the other hand, 
though they all say "Yes" to the normative question, may say 
either "Yes" or "No" to the factual one. Substantive equalitari-
ans say "Yes," and procedural equalitarians say "No." These 
points are very important to keep in mind in any discussion of 
distributive justice. 
III. 
Let us now proceed to a discussion of inequalitarian theories 
of the basic material principle of distributive justice. The olig-
archical theory is perhaps not often espoused in so many words, 
but it does appear to be acted on to a considerable extent in 
practice, and, in any case, it is a very instructive theory to study. 
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It maintains, it will be remembered, that the Q in proportion 
to which P is to be distributed is wealth, material possessions. 
It takes quite literally at least the first part of the saying of Jesus, 
For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, 
and he shall have more abundance; but 
whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken 
away, even that he hath.o 
But, with all due respect for Jesus' real meaning, it seems rea-
sonable to say that the oligarchical way of favoring the haves 
over the have-nots is a very paradigm of injustice. Such a theory 
of distributive justice seems to be mistaken in principle, and it 
is important to see why. It is mistaken, it seems to me, for this 
reason: because the Q which it takes as a basis for distribution 
is itself something that is distributed by human actions and 
social institutions, and hence something that may itself be or 
have been distributed justly or unjustly, namely wealth or 
property. If this point is well taken, then we may argue quite 
generally that no theory is acceptable which offers as its basic 
principle of distribution the principle that P is to be distributed 
in proportion to some Q whose distribution is itself dependent 
on human action and social policy, e.g., wealth, power, or social 
position. It also follows that even the democratic theory, as 
Aristotle understood it, is mistaken; for its Q was "free birth," 
and this, in the sense in which the Greeks took it, was some-
thing socially determined, not something one had either by 
nature or by one's own efforts. 
It should be added that, in any case, already possessed wealth 
is plausible as a basis for distributing other things only if it is a 
reliable index of the presence of some other Q which is more 
reasonably taken as a basis of distribution, for example, ability, 
intelligence, or merit. This is shown by the fact that the de-
fenders of oligarchy have usually argued that the possession of 
wealth actually is an index of something more fundamental, 
when they have bothered to give any argument at all. 
Putting off the meritarian or aristocratic theory for a mo-
ment, let us look at inequalitarian views of our third sort, those 
taking as a basis for distribution such Q's as blood, sex, color, 
height, or native intelligence. These views are right in not 
choosing as the fundamental basis of distribution anything that 
e Matt. 13:12. 
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is directly distributable by man or society. Instead they take as 
the basis of distribution some Q whose presence is due to nature 
(though, indirectly, through eugenics, man can do something 
even about the distribution oE color, etc.). It seems apparent, 
however, that this too is a mistake. For it is reasonable to claim 
that the use of blood, color, height, etc., as a [·undamental basis 
of distribution is also unjust in itself. It is fair enough to use 
them as a basis of distribution in certain contexts, e.g., as a 
basis fo r distribu ting costumes or parts in plays. But to take 
any of them as the most basic Q for the distribution of oppor-
tunities, offices, etc., is as unjust as taking wealth as one's basic 
Q, though for a different reason. The reason (the main rea-
son, not the only one) in this case, I think, is that, if we take 
color, height, etc., as a basis for distributing P, then we are bas-
ing our distribution on a feature which discriminates between 
individuals but which the individual has done and can do 
nothing about; we are treating people differently in ways that 
profoundly affect their lives because of differences for which 
they have no responsibility. 
The most plausible of the natural Q's just mentioned to take 
as a basis of distribution is native intelligence. Even native 
intelligence (to be distinguished here from developed intelli-
gence) will not do, however, as our ultimate basis of distribu-
tion, though it is certainly in a better case than height or color 
of skin. For it is something that can be adequately detected and 
ga uged only in the course of some kind of program of educa-
tion , formal or informal, so that its use as a basis of distribution 
presupposes a prior equal distribution of the opportunities for 
such an education. 
In any case, we may also say that blood, sex, color, height, 
etc., cannot reasonably be taken as important bases of distribu-
tion unless they serve as reliable signs oE some Q, like ability or 
merit, which is more justly employed as a touchstone for the 
treatment of individuals. This again is shown by the fact that 
when proponents of racial discrimination and slavery have 
given arguments at all, they have often argued precisely that 
these features may be taken as signs of such more acceptable Q's. 
We have mentioned merit as clearly a more acceptable Q 
than acquired features like wealth on the one hand or natural 
ones like color on the other. Shall we then use merit as our 
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most fundamental basis of distribution? That we should is the 
position of: the aristocrats or meritarians, including Aristotle 
himself and, more recently, Sir David Ross. What do they mean 
by "merit?" Aristotle meant excellence or virtue, and he dis-
tinguished two kinds of excellences or virtues: intellectual ones 
and moral ones; Sir David, however, means by "merit" simply 
moral virtuc. 10 We may therefore understand the meritarians 
to hold that, basic.:1lly at any rate, P is to be distributed to peo-
ple in proportion to their degree of excell ence, intellectual, 
moral, or both. What sha ll we say of this conception of social 
justice? 
It certainly has a good deal of plausibility. In particular, its 
Q does not suffer fTom the defects of those of the other two kinds 
of inequalitarianism. For merit or excellence is not something 
distributed (differentially) by nature without any help from 
the individual, as color, blood, and height are; nor is it some-
thing that can be distributed justly or unjustly by man or his 
social institutions, as wealth is. Only the potentialities for ex-
cellence can be provided by nature, and only the opportunities 
and accessories for it can be provided by society; excellence or 
merit itself must be achieved or won by individuals themselves. 
It looks, therefore, as if merit may be just the Q we are looking 
for. Nevertheless, I am convinced that it wiJI not do either. I 
tried to show this once or twice before but now suspect that the 
argument I then used is fallacious.11 There is, however, another 
argument which I hope is better. This argument is that merit 
cannot be the basic Q in matters of distributive justice, since a 
recognition of merit as the basis of distribution is justified only 
if every individual has an equal chance of achieving all the 
merit he is capable of (and it cannot simply be assumed that 
they have had this chance) . If the individuals competing for P 
have not had an equal chance to achieve aJI the merit they are 
c.:1pable of, then merit is not a fair basis for distributing shares 
of P among them. H this is so, then, before merit can reasonably 
be adopted as a ground of distribution, there must first be a 
prior equal distribution of the conditions for achieving merit, 
at least so far as this is within the power of human society. This 
is where such things as equality of opportunity, equality before 
the Jaw, an~ equality of access to the means of education come 
•• W:; D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 135·138. 
" Cf. Ethics, p. 40. 
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into the picture. In other words, recogmt1on of merit as a 
criterion of distribution is reasonable only against the back-
ground of a recognition of the principle of equality; the pri-
mary basis of distribution is not merit but equality, substantive 
or procedural. 
It is worth mentioning, in view of the many recent discus-
sions of "the distribution of education," first, that, strictly speak-
ing, society cannot distribute education but only the means of 
and opportunities for education, and, second, that it cannot dis-
tribute these in accordance with excellence or merit, since the 
achievement of excellence or merit presupposes a process of 
education. To this it may be replied that educational means 
and opportunities are to be distributed, not equally, but accord-
ing to capacity. But then we may rejoin by pointing out that 
people's capacities can be determined only by educating them 
in some way, and that basic educational means and opportuni-
ties must therefore be distributed equally, since all must be 
given an equal chance to show their capacities if their capacities 
are to be used as a basis for determining their shares of other 
things. It follows, of course, from such premises, that a program 
of merit scholarships is fully just only if all of the candidates 
have had equal educational opportunities of the relevant kinds, 
though it may be a good thing anyway, as I believe it is. 
None of what I have said is meant to imply that merit is not 
an acceptable basis of distribution in some contexts. I believe, 
indeed, that it is just to recognize and reward merit or excel-
lence in certain ways; I have been trying to show only that merit 
cannot reasonably be regarded as our most basic criterion of 
distribution, as meritarians think. Excellence is an excellent 
thing, but, if it is not taken to be its own sole reward, we must 
all equally be given the chance to attain it so far as we are able. 
In this discussion I have been identifying merit with excel-
lence, intellectual or moral; but there are, of course, other 
things that it may be taken to mean, e.g., contribution to society 
or to the welfare of mankind, and it may be proposed that we 
should employ one of these things as our basis of distribution. 
What I have just said applies, however, to these further forms 
of merit also; they may be acceptable as secondary grounds of 
distributive policy, but they will not do as primary ones. It 
should be added that at ·least one of the reasons for rewarding 
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merit in these and other forms is that doing so is useful, i.e., 
conducive to the public good. But to argue that merit should 
be rewarded because it is useful to do so is not yet to show that 
jwtice requires us to reward it. What is useful may be right to 
do, but it is not ipso facto a requirement of justice, though it 
need not be unjust either. This may be one of the meanings of 
the puzzling parable of the workers in the vineyard. 
It may be objected that we have been neglecting an im-
portant theory of social justice, one which may have more sub-
scribers, if we count both sides of the Iron Curtain, than any 
other, namely, that the just society is that which takes from each 
according to his ability and gives to each according to his need. 
This theory sounds like a form of inequalitarianism, since it is 
obvious that people's abilities and needs differ widely. It may, 
however, be contended that it presupposes a basic equalitarian-
ism, and this contention seems to be supported by the fact that 
those who accept the theory mean to be equalitarians at least in 
principle. One of the good things about this ability-need theory, 
whether one accepts it or not, is its recognition that duties and 
tasks are to be distributed, as well as opportunities, rights, and 
goods. But what is involved in the notion that tasks are to be 
distributed according to ability? Not a belief in inequality, but 
precisely the reverse. For we do not treat people equally if we 
ask of them exactly the same performance. To some a given 
task is easy, to others it is difficult, and hence, to ask the same of 
everyone is actually to treat them unequally, asking sacrifices 
from some that others are not required to make. To ask from 
each according to his ability, then, is to ask the same propor-
tionate effort and sacrifice from each, in an effort to leave all as 
nearly equally well off as possible. In the same way, since needs 
differ, to give equally to all does not entail giving exactly the 
same thing to each. Shakespeare is surely unjust when he tells 
us in The Merchant of Venice not to trust 
The man that hath no music in himself, 
Nor is not moved with concord o£ sweet sounds, 
but it would not be unjust to give such a man a pair of skis 
when everyone else is being given a violin or a set of the latest 
Beatles recordings. To give to each according to his need is, 
again, to make the same proportionate contribution to the 
welfare of each, in an effort to make all as nearly equally well 
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off as possible. The ability-need theory is therefore reasonable 
only if it presupposes an equalitarian goal or ideal. 
IV 
1f what has been sa id is correct, then we may reasonably re-
gard inequalitarian views about the basic material principle of 
distributive justice as unsatisfactory, even if we cannot claim to 
have "disproved" them. The basic principle is that of equality, 
as Aristotle's democrats thought. Merit and other Q's which 
men have unequally may serve acceptably as secondary criteria 
of distribution, but the basic framework must be the principle 
of equality. This we may now state. It is the principle that 
'matters are to be so disposed, i.e., P is to be so distributed, that 
·everyone has an equal chance of achieving the best life he is 
capable of. This is the fou ndational principle of socia l justice. 
Of course, to apply this principle we must have some defensible 
conception of what the good life is, and which lives are better 
than others, and these are not easy matters; but they must be 
left for another occasion. 
For what it is worth, it may be pointed out that at least one 
leading meritarian, Aristotle, sometimes seems to presu ppose 
the principle of equality just stated. For example, he regards 
slavery as justified because he believes that there arc people 
who can enjoy the best lives they are capable of only if they are 
slaves of some master. In fact, more generally, he seems at his 
best to define the ideal state as one in which each member en-
joys the highest happiness-the most excellent activity-he is 
capable of attaining. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I should add that I do not 
mean to suggest that no extra attention should be given either 
to handicapped persons on the one hand, or to gifted individ-
uals on the other. I have no wish to attack enterprises like Proj-
ect Head Start, fellowship programs, etc. All that the principle 
of equal justice requires is that everyone be given an equal 
chance to enjoy the best life he is capable of, but it may be that 
doing this en tails our giving what seems to be extra attcmion to 
certa in sorts of people. Such attention seems extra only be-
cause it involves more effort or money, but it is not really extra 
(unjust), since it is necessary if we are to make the same pro-
portionate contribution to the best life of everyone. Some peo-
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pie simply are by nature harder to help on their way, and others 
easier, and we are, therefore, not unjust if we put more effort or 
money into helping some than we do into helping others, as 
long as all are enabled to make the same relative advance to-
ward the good life. 
One might object here that social justice consists, not in 
making possible the same relative advance for everyone, but 
rather in bringing everyone up to the same absolute level. One 
might contend, for example, that it is unjust for society to pu t 
anything extra into its gifted individuals until all the others, 
whether handicapped or not, have been brought up to the high-
est level possible for them, and that even then it is not unjust if 
it does not do anything extra for them. To deal with this ob-
jection we must distinguish two things a society might do for 
its members: ( 1) it might provide them with a certain level of 
material goods, (2) it might promote a certain level of goodness 
of life for them. These two things may overlap, but they are not 
the same. I am somewhat inclined to agree that society should 
try tO make available to everyone the same general level of ma-
terial possessions, at least up to a certain point. But material 
possessions are only externally connected with goodness of life, 
and it is the latter that society should be mainly concerned with . 
Now, some people just are ca pable of leading better li ves than 
others; these are, in fact, the "gifted" ones. Should not society, 
in justice, do what it can to help these members ach ieve the best 
lives they are capable of (provided it also helps the others), at 
least after and perhaps even before the others have reached 
their peaks? A few remarks may perhaps serve to guide further 
thinking on this matter. 
(a) It certainly seems only just that they shou ld be helped, 
if necessary, at least after the less gifted have reached their 
peaks. We must remember, however, that a just society will 
also be a free one, and that in a free society such individuals 
can and will do much to help themselves. (b) It is obviously 
conducive to the good, not on ly of the gifted individua ls, but 
of others, if the gifted arc aided even before the others have 
gone as high as they can. For, like Plato's rulers, they can then 
put their gifts to the social use of helping the others. (c) It 
would seem clear, a t any rate, that a just society must at least 
fJermil exceptional ind ivid uals to realize themselves, in so far 
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as this is compatible with others' doing so. (d) Since a just so-
ciety must provide the utmost freedom for each individual con-
sistent with the freedom and welfare of others, it must even run 
the risk that some, in seeking their own best life, will endanger 
those of others. (e) In practice, perhaps, any society that seeks 
to be just must work on two fronts all the time: that of making 
possible the achievement by the gifted of the best lives they can 
attain and that of making sure that others also are so positioned 
as to be able to attain the best lives open to them by virtue of 
their potentialities. 
v. 
Now, having steered the good ship justice safely through the 
straits of inequalitarianism into the haven of equalitarianism, 
we must ask what side of the harbor we are to anchor on, that of 
substantive or that of procedural equalitarianism. As was in-
dicated earlier, the difficulty in substantive equalitarianism is 
that there seems to be no factual respect in which all human 
beings are equal, no Q which they all have in the same degree 
and form. (There is the further point that, even if there were 
such a Q, it still might not follow that all men ought to be 
treated as equals; but this is balanced by the fact that, if there 
is no such Q, it also does not follow that men ought not to be 
treated as equals.) As Benn and Peters put it,12 
... if we strip away [from human nature] all the qualities 
in respect o£ which men differ, what is left? ... we are left 
with an undifferentiated potentiality .... 'Human nature' 
implies a varying potentiality (or a certain limited range o£ 
qualities ... ; it is not another quality that all men possess 
equally, on account of which they should in some positive 
way be treated alike. 
Benn and Peters conclude that equalitarianism must take a 
procedural form.1a 
. . . What we really demand, when we say that all men are 
equal, is that none shall be held to have a claim to better 
treatment than another, in advance of good grounds being 
produced ••.• Understood in this way, the principle o( equal-
ity does not prescribe positively that all human beings be 
u Of'· cit., p. 109. 
taibid., pp. 110·111; d. M. Ginsberg, On }wtice in Society (Pelican Books, 
1965), p. 79. 
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treated alike; it is a presumption against treating them differ-
ently, in any respect, until grounds for distinction have been 
shewn. It does not assume, therefore, a quality which all 
men have to the same degree, which is the ground of the pre-
sumption, for to say that there is a presumption means that 
no grounds need be shewn. The onus o£ justification rests on 
whoever would make distinctions. To act justly, then, is to 
treat all men alike except where there are relevant differences 
between them .... Presume equality until there is reason to 
presume otherwise. 
With some qualifications, I am inclined to agree with this view 
of the matter. It still seems reasonable, however, to ask why we 
should adopt this procedural principle in the case of all the 
beings who are human, if they are not equal in any factual 
sense. The answer, I think, has two parts. (I) One part is that 
it seems to be a rule of reason to deal with similar things in 
similar ways. Thus, inductive reasoning may be thought of as 
depending on a presumption that we are to make similar asser-
tions about similar things, unless we have evidence to the con-
trary. To quote Perelman: 
The fact is, the rule of justice results from a tendency, natural 
to the human mind, to regard as normal and rational, and so 
as requiring no supplementary justification, a course o£ be-
haviour in conformity with precedent.14 
This view may be substantiated somewhat by reference to the 
work of Piaget on the moral judgment of children.111 But it does 
not suffice as an answer to our question. For, as we saw, and as 
Perelman recognizes, this rule of reason-treat similar cases simi-
larly-is purely formal. Besides, even though, in our geological 
inductions, we must presume that what is true of one rock is 
true of others unless there is evidence to the contrary, we hardly 
need draw the conclusion that, in our behavior, we ought to 
lreal all rocks in the same way unless we can show good reasons 
for treating them differently. Why then should we treat all 
human beings equally until we have good reasons for not doing 
so? (2) The reply, it seems to me, must be that human beings 
are different from rocks, they have desires, emotions, and 
minds, and are capable, as rocks are not, of having lives that are 
"op. cit., p. 86. For rhc point I am borrowing, see pp. 79-87. C£. J. N. Find· 
lay, LanguaGe• Mind and J!alue (London, 1963). p. 250. 
u jean Ptaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York, 1948). Perel-
man refers to Piaget's Apprentissage et connaissance, p. 42. 
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good or bad. It is this (act that all men are similarly capable of 
experiencing a good or bad life, not the fact that they are equal 
in some respect (if they are), that justifies the presumption that 
they are to be treated as equals. With this, somewhat hesitantly, 
1 drop anchor on the procedmal equalitarian side. 
VI. 
Many problems remain, but we can take up only two of 
them, and then only briefly. ( I) An equalitarian might hold, 
not only that justice requires us to treat all human beings equal-
ly (in the sense explained above, in which giving A a violin and 
B a pair of skis may be treating them equally, not in the sense 
of treating them exactly alike), but that any departure from 
equality, any unequal treatment is ifJso facto unjust and wrong. 
But few equalitarians have had the temerity to espouse this 
position, nor have 1, though I shou ld point out that it is much 
more plausible to mainta in that it is never just or right to treat 
people ttnequally than that it is never just or right to treat them 
differently. 1 f one docs not adopt this position, however, one 
must allow that unequal treatment is sometimes just or right, 
that the differences between people sometimes justify treating 
them unequally. And then the question arises: what differences 
between humans justify treating them unequally? What differ-
ences are relevant to questions of distribution? This is not an 
easy question, and it is sometimes fe lt that the relevant differ-
ences are so many and so various as to render the principle of 
equality of no effect. An incqualitarian must answer the ques-
tion, too; but he could say that all differences arc relevant, if 
not, prove why not ; whereas the equalitarian must claim that 
the relevant differences can be limited in some way. Now, 1 
have already intimated that in various kinds of context various 
kinds of considerations are relevant to questions o( distribution, 
e.g., that differences in height or color of skin may be relevant 
to decisions about the distribution of costumes nnd roles in 
plays. In a sense, then, if we abstract from context, the variety 
of relevant considerations, like that of evil spirits, is indeed 
legion. 1n another sense, however, each context determines 
what considerations are relevant and limits them; not all con-
siderations are relevant in all contexts. Differences in sex, color, 
height, or dramatic ability may be relevant to decisions about 
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casting players, but they are not always relevant; indeed they 
seem obviously irrelevant to most questions of social policy of 
the kind that a theory of distributive justice is primarily con-
cerned to provide for. For such questions, I suggest, the relevant 
features of people are not such things as color, height, and the 
like, but only those features that bear, directly or indirectly, on 
the goodness or badness of the lives of which they are capable, 
for example, differences in ability or need. 
(2) The last question is somewhat different, and may be put 
roughly by asking, "Why should we be just?" More accurately 
put, it is this: why is justice, conceived as treating people equal-
ly in the sense explained, right?16 One traditional answer is that 
of the deontologist in ethics, namely, that justice or equality of 
treatment is right in itself, as keeping promises is, or telling the 
truth. Another standard answer is that of the utilitarian, that 
justice or equal treatment is right because it is necessary for or 
at least conducive to the greatest general good or the greatest 
general happiness. As between these two views I should say 
that the first is essentially correct and the second mistaken. I 
should like, however, to propose a third mediating possibility. 
If we ask what the Ideal state of affairs would be, then, as far as 
I can see, the deontologist and the utilitarian can both accept 
the following statement: 
The Ideal is that state of affairs in which every person (or 
perhaps every sentient being) has the best life he is capable 
of. 
If this formulation of the Ideal is correct, as I believe it is, then 
we can plausibly argue that justice in the sense of equal treat-
ment is right because it is a constitutive condition of the Ideal. 
For then, as Bentham declared, it is an essential aspect of the 
Ideal that everybody be counted as one and nobody as more 
than one. In the Ideal, as thus formulated, everyone is equally 
well off in the sense that everyone has the best life he is capable 
of, which is all that can reasonably be asked for. An even more 
ideal equality would be realized, it is true, in a state of affairs in 
which everyone had the ideally best life or at least the best life 
that any human being is capable of; but such a state of affairs 
would be wholly impractical and Utopian as an ideal. It could 
11 Meritarians have a corresponding question: why is justice, conceived as 
treating people according to their merits; right? They too can give either deon-
tological or utilitarian answers. 
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only be wished, not worked, for. Logically, of course, one cou ld 
reject even the more practical Ideal sketched in my statemen t, 
since "questions of ultimaLe ends do not admit of proof" ;17 but 
i t is hard to believe that anybody would in fact reject i t if he 
were fu lly informed and completely reasonable, 
... whose even-balanced soul 
From first youth tested up to extreme old age, 
Business could not make dull, nor passion wild; 
Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole . .. ,18 
"Mill. ofJ. cit., opening sentence of Ch. lV. 
13 Mauhcw Arnold, "To a Friend." 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Uni-
versity o£ Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy 
Roberts, Lhe chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the 
Graduate Magazine that 
Lhe Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or 
a series of lecLUres, some outstanding national or world figure 
to speak on "Values of L iving"-just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to do in his comses "The Human Situation" and 
"Plan for Living." 
In the following .June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income {rom this fund should be spent in a quest of so-
cial betterment by bringing to the University each year out-
standing world leaders for a l.ecture or series of lectures, yet 
wilh a design so broad in its outline that in the years to come, 
if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take some 
more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lecLUred on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett 
C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas 
School of Law as part of his book Stt~dents' Culture and Perspec-
tives: Lectures on Nfedical and General Education. The selection 
of lecturers for lhe Lindley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been pub-
lished, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 





"The Idea of Man-An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology." 
By Jose fcrr;~tcr Mora, Professor o£ Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College. 
"Changes in Events and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, rrofessor of Philosophy, University o~ Manchester. 
"Moral J'hilosophy and ~he Analysis of Language." 
By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Phi losophy, Swarthmore Colkge. 
"Humntl Freedom and the Self." 
By Roderick ;vr. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy. Brown University. 
